Jassim the Leader: Founder of Qatar Read online

  Characteristically, Abdullah refused to admit defeat. He attempted to build an alliance with the Saudi state in the Najd himself, following the hurried withdrawal of Egyptian forces in 1840. Fresh out of a Cairene jail, Faisal bin Turki Al Saud was initially prepared to consider such an alliance. But doing time in Muhammad Ali’s Egypt had matured his political sagacity. (He was to rule adroitly for twenty years and with increasing strength.) Faisal recognised a lost cause when he saw one and ended military cooperation by asking the venerable Sheikh Abdullah to leave Dammam. Unfortunately, Faisal’s wisdom was not contagious. Isa bin Turaif had never recognised Bahraini authority in Qatar, it was a well-known fact, but he had helped Muhammad bin Khalifa defeat his great-uncle. Rather than keeping Bahrain’s new ruler as a friend, or just keeping quiet as two Khalifa factions fought each other, he constantly attempted to get involved. He not so secretly encouraged Muscat to attempt another invasion of Bahrain in 1843. The plan was to no avail; Muscat was not interested. But news of the instigator’s identity reached the ears of both Khalifa factions. Impressively, bin Turaif had managed to do what no one else could have. He had soured relations with both Khalifa factions at the same time, a move he would regret to his death, which was fast and fatefully approaching.

  Muhammad bin Thani showed a much greater appreciation of the situation, and had strongly supported Muhammad bin Khalifa’s claim to power over all of Bahrain. He had permitted ships to be stationed in Fuwairit after Abdullah managed to capture Manama briefly that year, reasoning that if one Bahraini sheikh was to fight another, then neither would be fighting him. Muhammad was not supporting Muhammad bin Khalifa out of conviction and would not allow Jassim to take part in the attack on Sheikh Abdullah in Manama. Jassim too was unimpressed by the merit of Muhammad bin Khalifa’s claim to rule, but he did wish to weaken the hold Bahrain enjoyed over western Qatar. For this reason, the young Jassim rashly allowed some of his kinsmen from the Mi’daad to settle at Bida in conspicuous support of bin Turaif. The whole of the Al bu Kuwara, under Muhammad bin Said, had also joined forces with the Al bin Ali chief, as had his brother-in-law Ali bin Nasir in Wakra. But Muhammad bin Thani was wise to bide his time in Fuwairit, delaying any move to join forces with Bida. Bin Turaif’s leadership skills were highly questionable, as his years in exile had proved. As far as Muhammad bin Thani was concerned, there was no hurry to fight in Bahrain. History was to prove him right. Trouble was coming to Qatar soon enough; there was no need to go looking for it.

  It is odd that the British did not oppose bin Turaif’s appropriation of Bida in 1843, considering the lengths to which their Political Resident had gone to prevent it. The reason may have something to do with Hennell enjoying six months’ leave in Britain. He had been deputised by a 23-year-old lieutenant, Arnold Burrowes Kemball, who lacked his superior’s experienced caution. (Kemball was photographed in 1860 by the young French aristocrat Camille Silvy, complete with his Victorian sideburns and waistcoat, a dead ringer for Prince Albert – but without the hair.) Kemball welcomed the turn of events in Bida, convinced that with a new population came an opportunity to wipe the slate clean and improve relations. He felt the Al bin Ali would tackle any piracy problems with alacrity. He was also pleased that bin Turaif’s men were now, as he put it, ‘within the Arabian side of the restrictive line’. And for almost three years it looked as if this young man’s optimism was well founded. The Al bin Ali were at last settled; Sheikh Abdullah was out of the picture. In November 1843, bin Turaif had paid an official visit, meeting up with Sheikh Muhammad bin Khalifa and his supporters in Bahrain. The Al bin Ali chief had even offered his services in stamping out the continuing resistance that Abdullah offered from the Hasawi coast. It was an unprecedented period of calm.

  But things didn’t last. This was no peace, merely an absence of war. As Muhammad bin Khalifa became more confident of his position, he once again began to interfere in Qatar. Bin Turaif was alarmed to discover that Bahrain was rebuilding the fort at Zubara. He was aware too of frequent Bahraini visits to Fuwairit. The Al Khalifa were showering their unwanted attentions on northeast Qatar. Most importantly of all, bin Turaif was afraid that his beloved home town of Huwaila would fall into Bahraini hands once again. He decided, therefore, to seek out a military alliance with the very man who had caused his many years of exile in the first place, the father-in-law who had caused his people’s exodus to Qais. He sought out Sheikh Abdullah. Restarting the Bahraini civil war was surprisingly simple, but this time bin Turaif was fighting on the other side, and openly declared his support for Muhammad bin Khalifa’s arch-enemy. This was exactly the kind of reckless decision which made Muhammad bin Thani wary of throwing in his lot with the Al bin Ali. Jassim would have learned a valuable lesson.

  Bin Turaif’s dramatic change of policy caught Muhammad bin Khalifa by surprise. News of it coincided, however, with the arrival of a British naval squadron patrolling the Gulf in November 1847. The Bahraini sheikh made straight for the flagship, commanded by a Captain William Lowe, to let it be known that the maritime peace was about to broken. Muhammad embellished the facts considerably, as Lowe heard how Sheikh Abdullah, based on Qais all these years following his expulsion from Dammam, was plotting an invasion with the Al bin Ali chief. Their plan was to attack with hundreds of ships post-haste. Knowing it would provoke a reaction, Sheikh Muhammad added that Bahrain had no choice but to defend itself with a fleet of its own baghlas, each one bearing men armed to the teeth.

  Muhammad bin Khalifa played the part perfectly. Lowe left their meeting, that 2 November, irritated by Bida’s new alliance with Abdullah and the prospect of a major sea battle after four years of calm. His career depended on the serenity of the shipping lanes; Lowe was determined that there should be no disturbance to trade. Without waiting to ascertain whether the story so expertly spun was accurate, the captain wrote to bin Turaif informing him that the Royal Navy would seize any of his vessels found to be carrying tribesmen or weapons anywhere in the Gulf. Rather than responding to the British, bin Turaif demanded that Muhammad return the vessels he had stolen from Abdullah. This hasty response allowed Muhammad to play his trump card. Writing to Lowe on 4 November, he used bin Turaif’s response as proof that an invasion was imminent and that the ships the Al bin Ali chief spoke of were to be used for ‘an act of perfidy. He [bin Turaif] has contacted Abdullah bin Ahmad, and his son Mubarak, and the others who are with him, of the Banu Hajir tribe. His object is to invade my territory, and subject the people of Qatar who are my dependants to himself.’

  Bin Turaif attempted to reason with Hennell, insisting it was Bahrain which threatened Qatar’s territorial integrity.

  We write to inform you with regard to Muhammad bin Khalifa and his brother Ali, who have acted treacherously towards us in return for the good, which as you know, we did them. They launched six baghlas and two bateels, when the captain arrived at Bahrain and put a stop to their proceedings. The captain also wrote an interdictory letter to us, and we desisted from all hostile preparations. Subsequently Ali bin Khalifa put to sea with warships and three boats, and cast anchor at Fuwairit. We know not what his object may be, but you are aware that Huwaila is in our country, and we fear but he should take it. Such is the way in which they harass and annoy us in exchange for the services we rendered there.

  Hennell didn’t reply. Bin Turaif was convinced Bahrain and Britain had come to some arrangement. There was no time to be lost. With scant preparation or time to recruit large numbers of men, he risked the destruction of his fleet on 7 November to land men at Fuwairit. His haste meant he could muster only 400, but bin Turaif was hopeful other tribesmen would rally to his cause. Muhammad bin Thani’s heart may have been with him, and he welcomed bin Turaif into the town. But he knew that this was not an army to fight a British-backed Bahrain. There was only one way the coming confrontation would end. Sure enough, Muhammad bin Khalifa ordered the fleet to land his 1,000-strong army at Zubara, where it could be supported with cavalry and ample supplies. T
he men would then march across the top of the peninsula and fall upon Fuwairit. As the military build-up intensified, the British authorities dispatched several warships, including the eighteen-gun sloop Elphinstone, to blockade Bida and prevent Turaif from receiving reinforcements or supplies by sea.

  On 13 November, Hennell made a show of attempting to stop any maritime confrontation with letters to both belligerents. The missive reveals that he had no interest in preventing battle on land. ‘It is not my intention to interfere between you so long as hostilities are confined to Bahrain and Qatar, but any of your vessels found cruising in the Persian side of the Gulf or elsewhere without the restrictive line will be immediately seized by our vessels of war.’ But this was not the case at all. It is clear Lowe’s orders were to stop Qatari ships only. Just two days after Hennell’s warning, Ali bin Khalifa landed at Al Khor with some five hundred men under his command. His ships must have sailed past British vessels anchored in Muharraq’s harbour. The Bahraini governors at Hasa and Qatif, Ahmad al-Sudairi and bin Uthman, had also sent men and supplies by sea. Muhammad bin Khalifa now landed with the remainder of his forces, leading an army of just under two thousand men.

  In the opposing camp, the Al bin Ali and their supporters had managed to recruit just 600 soldiers and no cavalry at all. Nor was there any hope of more troops from Qais or Bida, so long as a second Royal Naval squadron patrolled the Qatari coastline. It was clear to both Muhammad bin Thani and his son that the battle was lost before it was begun, and neither wanted to see their town come under siege. Discretion being the better part of valour, and urging bin Turaif to negotiate, neither Muhammad nor Jassim took part in the Battle of Fuwairit on 17 November 1847.

  The fight was spectacularly short lived. Bin Turaif was killed almost immediately, along with 80 of his kinsmen. The resolve of the hastily assembled coalition withered within the hour. Satisfied that the Al Thani had not joined the fray, Muhammad bin Khalifa marched on Bida with the intention of giving the Al bin Ali a lesson history would never forget. Once again, Britain allowed Bahraini warships to pass down the eastern Qatari coast and raze Bida to the ground for the third time in 30 years. Its people were transported en masse back to Bahrain for closer scrutiny. Bin Turaif’s impotent ally, Sheikh Abdullah, fled to Nabend on the Persian coast, where he lived out the rest of his life. Sheikh Abdullah’s son Mubarak marched to the Najd with the 200 men he had failed to lead into battle. Bin Turaif’s children were exiled to Qais once more, and Ali bin Khalifa was instructed to remain as Bahrain’s representative. This was without doubt the lowest point in Qatar’s bid for independence; all leadership had been eliminated. It was into this power vacuum that the Al Thani now stepped. Their time had arrived.

  The Battle of Fuwairit was a turning point. Muhammad bin Thani’s patience and good sense were to pay dividends. By remaining neutral throughout the ill-prepared conflict, by surviving the worst of the storm, Muhammad bin Thani had held on to Fuwairit, Sulaiman al-Suwaidi had regained Bida once more, and Ali bin Nasir was undisputed leader in Wakra. The destruction wrought by Muhammad bin Khalifa had, ironically, helped forge the idea of a Qatari identity. A poor leader, bin Turaif had nevertheless fought and died to keep the peninsula free of foreign interference. The effort was not lost on the sheikhs who remained. Jassim was to learn from bin Turaif’s mistake. He realised that an independent Qatar could not be created through the strength and alliances of one tribe, but rather through a union of tribes backed by a powerful ally.

  The Wahhabi opportunity

  When Faisal bin Turki left Egypt, he had demanded the ‘rebel’ Sheikh Abdullah leave Dammam in exchange for annual tribute from Abdullah’s rival and grand-nephew, Muhammad. Faisal was in need of money quickly if he were to stand any chance of reestablishing the Saud–Wahhabi state. By the late 1840s, he had been largely successful and had taken absolute control of the Najd and Hasa provinces. Faisal’s growing strength and political influence were impossible to ignore. The Qatari peninsula had no natural barrier to invasion from Hasa and the province’s coastal town of Uqair was a mere 30 miles from Bahrain, an ideal location from which to launch an invasion. This unhappy geographic proximity maintained regional tensions right up until the beginning of the 21st century. But Bahrain’s fleet was well over a thousand ships strong. Faisal’s army was far superior in strength and number, but transporting it to the island of Bahrain was fraught with danger. Bahrain was the shark to the Wahhabi elephant, both powerful in their own element.

  The shift in regional power prompted a scramble for new political alliances. Muhammad bin Thani would have been keenly aware that any additional agreement between Faisal and Muhammad bin Khalifa would prove highly detrimental to Fuwairit and Qatar, depriving the peninsula of political leverage. There was ample historical precedent to goad him into action. Just a decade earlier, when Egyptian forces were allied with the Al Khalifa in Hasa, an invasion force was on the verge of attacking Jabir bin Nasir’s Naim tribe for refusal to pay tribute to Bahrain. Muhammad needed to form an alliance with Faisal before Muhammad bin Khalifa, if he were to stand any chance of manipulating Wahhabi strength and ridding Qatar of Bahraini interference once and for all.

  The first step in realising such an alliance was to move closer to Hasa. Maintaining control over Fuwairit, Muhammad, Jassim and the Al Thani moved to Doha in 1849. The town had an excellent natural harbour and was still deserted following Bahraini reprisals three years earlier. Their authority and prestige were growing as the tribe successfully defended its expansion. When the Al bin Ali survivors eventually returned to Bida, not one of them made any pretence at leadership. Muhammad bin Thani was the man with whom all officials dealt. And when yet another Abu Dhabi pirate sought refuge in Qatar after stealing a Kuwaiti ship, Hennell contacted Muhammad for restitution, referring to him as Sheikh of Doha and Fuwairit. The Al Thani chief was no longer just the leader of the Mi’daad now; he had also taken the Al bu Kuwara under his wing too, along with the few Al Musallam, Sulaithi and Manai tribesmen in Doha. (The town was right next to Bida, just 400 yards away in fact, and the two settlements would soon be joined for ever.) This unity and recognition of authority brought safety, which encouraged the arrival of migrant workers. An increasing population brought increasing returns to the town’s pearling revenue. Muhammad now cut quite the figure in society and was in a far stronger position to contact the Wahhabi emir, Faisal. He had something to offer. Qatar’s east coast was under his control; what was needed now was to remove Bahrain’s aspiration to suzerainty.

  An opportunity came in February 1851. Muhammad discovered that Faisal was on the move, leading an army from the Najd to an oasis called Jooda, between Qatif and Hasa. Tens of hundreds of men were reported to be with him. It was clear the Wahhabi emir was attempting an invasion. But of whom? Sheikh Muhammad’s thoughts must have raced as he considered a myriad of possibilities. There was only one chance to get this right; Muhammad bin Khalifa did not yet consider the Al Thani as an enemy and Wahhabi intentions were unclear. What might he demand from Qatar? Could Faisal be persuaded to use Doha as a springboard to attack Bahrain? Would it be possible to bring in Sheikh Abdullah’s exiled sons, now led by Mubarak bin Abdullah? The British political agent, Hennell, was asking equally searching questions, and wrote for some answers. Faisal at last explained his intentions. ‘The Bahrain sheikhs have squandered their property on my subjects so that they might attach them to their own side while excusing themselves from paying me tribute.’

  As more details became clear, Muhammad must have realised he was about to play host to yet another army that could not be denied entry to Doha for long, but which might be distracted into invading Bahrain. He needed to buy some time, and turned to Jassim to delay Faisal while he attempted to gather the ousted Khalifa family on Qais to propose the invasion of Bahrain to the Wahhabi emir. Demonstrating incredible strength of character and loyalty to his father (he was sympathetic to the Wahhabi cause throughout his life), a 24-year-old Jassim led horse and foot soldi
ers through the streets of Doha and Bida, flying a red Qatari banner, towards the vanguard of Faisal’s army, led by a truly ferocious Bedouin warrior called Musa’id. That Musa’id perished on the end of Jassim’s lance was enough to ensure his own personal prestige as a respected warrior, but his self-confidence was no doubt boosted as his men recognised his genuine leadership skills too. Faisal’s vanguard was driven back to camp at Mesaimeer. He had bought the time his father needed with utmost credit, and his father did not squander the window of opportunity Jassim had provided. At his instigation, the rebel Mubarak bin Abdullah Al Khalifa informed Faisal directly that he could bring men and transport ships to Doha for a proposed invasion of Bahrain and that arrangements had already been made with Muhammad bin Thani. If any additional incentive were needed, Sheikh Abdullah’s son further promised an annual tribute of 10,000 German crowns once the Wahhabis were safely installed in Bahrain. Faisal agreed and marched his forces towards Doha to prepare.

  As he drew near to the town that May, Sheikh Muhammad bin Khalifa’s brother Ali sailed out to Zakhnuniya island, opposite Faisal’s camp, on 2 May, and suggested a delegate be sent to negotiate, and that Bahrain was prepared to offer a year’s tribute and all arrears in order to avert war. The reply demanded that Ali parley in person, to which he responded: ‘If you are pleased to make peace on the terms already proposed, good. Otherwise there is no further necessity to wait longer for us. You can go where you like and we will be there before you.’