Jassim the Leader: Founder of Qatar Page 12

  Reading between the lines, Muhammad bin Thani was probably informing the British that Qatar would no longer pay 9,000 krans to Bahrain. But whatever Muhammad’s exact position, Smith felt Jassim and his father had hoisted the Ottoman flag willingly and told the British consul-general in Baghdad the same. Colonel Herbert sent a brief letter to a gloating Midhat. ‘The Ottoman authorities with the expedition have acted contrary to Your Excellency’s intentions and repeated assurances.’ Midhat didn’t reply – he didn’t need to. Jassim’s acceptance of the flag was based on his own pragmatic considerations and not achieved by force of arms. Kuwait had accepted Ottoman sovereignty in exactly the same way. Midhat could only wish all military conquest was so simple.

  British outrage is hard to understand. Jassim had changed his allegiance to the Porte for several excellent reasons. Before the Saudi civil war, Jassim had always been a sincere ally to Abdullah bin Faisal, who had continued to aid Jassim right up until 1870. In that year, for example, remnants of Abdullah’s confederates continued to harass some clans of Naim to such an extent that many looked to leave for Bahrain. One Naim notable, Abdullah bin Muhammad, even told Major Smith that Jassim’s use of Wahhabi loyalists had turned life for the Naim into a living hell. ‘We have been turned out … our chief, Rashid bin Jubbur [sic], is inland and afraid to show … under the circumstances, if we proceed to Bahrain, who will answer for our wives, children and property?’ But Abdullah was losing the fight against his brother. The tribes of Najd didn’t want him. Jassim needed a new ally at the very same time as the Ottomans were interested in returning to eastern Arabia.

  In the meantime, Qatar was increasingly vulnerable to raids by Saud bin Faisal’s troops. The year 1871 was a particularly bad one; Saud’s supporters had cut off Doha’s water supply. Even if Jassim had chosen an alliance with the British, their ships could never have stopped Saud’s attacks. But Ottoman troops were newly arrived in Hasa, and could put up a defence. Similarly, Britain had shown itself unwilling, and probably unable, to prevent Al Khalifa money from reaching the Naim in north-west Qatar. Naim loyalty to Bahrain spelt the end of Jassim’s bid to unite the peninsula. The Ottomans, on the other hand, could put troops on the ground, and probably in places like Zubara, where they would really help the Al Thani cause. At a personal level, Jassim’s memories of his Bahraini cell, the terrible sea battle of 1868 and Doha’s recent destruction would naturally have left him inimical to Bahrain’s protectors, the British. The alliance with Midhat meant Jassim might play one empire off against another, and so benefit his vision for Qatar. The new situation sometimes left Jassim in a precarious and vulnerable position, but his tenacity ultimately brought rewards to the Al Thani and the peninsula during the 1870s.

  The Ottoman arrival

  In December 1871, the Ottoman authorities at Hasa finally sent a detachment of 100 troops and a field gun to Bida, under the command of Major Omer Bey. Once again, this was solicited in an invitation from Jassim, who now took over completely all his father’s responsibilities. The 1868 agreement with the British, which had made Muhammad bin Thani a primus inter pares, was now obsolete. Jassim would claim that it had always been obsolete, for it had had no teeth. The British weren’t willing to commit troops; they hadn’t landed an army in the Gulf for over fifty years. The Al Thani cause could not be progressed by ship, it needed armed men and cavalry. Jassim was convinced the Ottoman military could be manipulated into stopping any encroachment by the tribes of north-west Qatar, and possibly even end Bahraini interference once and for all.

  Welcoming the Ottomans into Qatar, however, and helping them extend their control from Basra up to the eastern limit of the peninsula, was fraught with risk too. Jassim would have to expect some changes and challenges to his authority, and Midhat Pasha didn’t disappoint. The governor had plans, drawn up long before the invasion of eastern Arabia. The Baghdad governor combined the four kaza, or districts, of Hasa, Qatif, Qatar and Najd into a single organisational structure called the Najd Mutasarrifiyya, or governorate. ‘Once the campaign is over,’ he instructed his administrators,

  the title of Qayamaqam [or district head] of Abdullah bin Faisal will be transformed into Mutasarrif [provincial governor]. Abdullah shall appoint Qayamaqams to Qatif, Qatar – and to smaller places, administrators. However, it should be seen to that if such appointments are likely to cause unrest among the Arabs, they must be put off until later. Furthermore, canonical judges from the Hanbali sect shall be appointed to Qatif, Hasa, and Qatar and, if possible, to Riyadh and Qasim … the canonical obligation of collecting zakah may take place but no other measure is to be imposed.

  These changes were mildly irritating for Jassim. For starters, his new Qayamaqam title came with no salary. Samuel Goldwyn’s witticism that ‘a verbal contract isn’t worth the paper it’s on’ is most à propos. He resented the fact that the Ottoman representative in town was also Doha’s new judge. Worse, it now seemed Qatar would actually be paying more in zakah to the Ottoman state that it had been paying Bahrain.

  Nevertheless, the change was fairly smooth and had not affected his standing among the tribes. Within a couple of years, it must have seemed that Midhat wanted to run Qatar as Britain ran Bahrain. So long as peace and trade were maintained, and occasional visits tolerated, internal affairs could be left to the locals. Jassim’s official appointment as Qayamaqam, instead of Omer Bey (despite some objection in Baghdad), had enhanced his status and prestige. The Ottoman stay was quite short and painless too. Most soldiers were withdrawn by the autumn of 1874. Jassim revelled in having a protector who gave him such a free hand to rule. He could also use his position to avoid negotiations when they were not in his interest. In the winter of that year, some Bahraini ships had bombarded the west coast and landed tribesmen in Qatar to pursue and kill men of the Banu Hajir in a bloody six-hour attack. Jassim wanted to extract revenge but received word that Bahrain had dispatched a peace delegation. In fact, Sheikh Isa had sent his own brother, Ahmad, to smooth over relations. A few years earlier, Jassim would have had to receive the delegation. But that was then. Ahmad got an imperious rebuke rather than a reception. The State Archives of Qatar record Jassim’s remarks, as he refused Ahmad permission to disembark. ‘Qatar and the places subordinated to it being Ottoman territory and myself an official representative of the Ottoman State, you should know better than to come to me.’ The ship returned to Bahrain. Sheikh Isa would be under no allusions as to Jassim’s intention. He was going to attempt to extinguish Bahrain’s influence in Qatar.

  Before I describe how this was achieved, you may be wondering what Britain was up to, especially as the Porte claimed Bahrain as part of their empire too. But it is the very complexity of Anglo-Ottoman relations which explains Jassim’s initial success. Naturally, the British government never officially accepted the Porte’s claim of sovereignty in Qatar. At the same time, however, it also avoided exacerbating tensions or provoking diplomatic incidents lest it upset a very delicate relationship. This was because British policy, even before the Crimean War, was to maintain the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire, and so preserve the balance of power in Europe. For British policy-makers in London, Qatar was a ‘vexed question’ that should not be allowed to end in conflict. It was for this reason that London and Delhi seldom saw eye to eye on Qatari issues. The British government in India had a quite different perspective. It needed to keep the Gulf as British as possible for all sorts of reasons: to limit French ambitions in Iran, provide a link in the route to India, and maintain access to Iraq and its great rivers. The result was a policy of deliberate vagueness. British diplomatic consensus was to accept the reality of the situation, but not publicly acknowledge it. Thus, London never gave any legitimacy to the Ottoman position on Qatar, but obviously acknowledged it by steering clear of confrontation. Midhat was well acquainted with the policy, and chose to deal with British Bahrain in exactly the same way.

  Some historians, like Zahlan, doubt that Jassim was aware of the many asp
ects of Anglo-Ottoman relations. This may be true, but by the same token many British and Ottoman officials in the Gulf were equally ignorant, and did not appreciate the game Jassim was playing. With genuine courage and strength of character, he intuitively knew how to neutralise their power. Many who have tried to walk the political tightrope between two opposing powers have fallen into an abyss; history is full of such examples – from Alcibiades to Quisling. But not Jassim; he crossed to the other side and emerged in a far more powerful position than the one he had inherited from Muhammad. In 1874, he needed to establish his authority over the north-west and push back Al Khalifa claims for good. He recognised that the town of Zubara was absolutely key to his plan. By welcoming any excuse to promote conflict there, and exacerbating the polarisation of tribal loyalties, Jassim felt confident he could draw the British and Ottomans into a confrontation neither wished to end in a fight. He would manipulate ensuing negotiations to have the British do his job for him. He would use the British to keep the Al Khalifa out of Qatar.

  The struggle for Zubara

  Zubara’s status was hotly disputed. Bahrain and Britain could both respond swiftly to the least provocation, which Jassim regularly provided through raids and misinformation. For example, on 16 August 1873, Major Charles Grant informed a new Political Resident, Colonel Edward Charles Ross, that a detachment of some one hundred men had embarked from Qatif to accompany the Ottoman officer Husain Effendi to Zubara. In point of fact, Grant had misinformed Ross, but the effect was the same. The Bahraini chief Sheikh Isa bin Ali reacted angrily and told Grant that something had to be done. The Naim clans living near Zubara were ‘his subjects under treaty’, as the retired Colonel Pelly would bear witness. Grant had no way of knowing the truth of the Bahraini chief’s claim, but suspected it was improbable. He observed that Bahrain hadn’t maintained power in Zubara for years, and Al Khalifa authority was weak ‘if it existed at all’.

  Sheikh Isa couldn’t afford to let the issue go; he feared the intrigues of Nasir bin Mubarak, a rebel Al Khalifa clansman who claimed the right to rule Bahrain. Isa had good reason to be nervous; he had come to power in 1869 when his father Ali had been killed in battle against the combined forces of his own brother Muhammad and Nasir bin Mubarak, grandson of Abdullah bin Ahmad. His plan was to re-establish, once again, a garrison at the town for the explicit purpose of hunting out Nasir. Ross was as keen as anyone to help the Naim, since they had never accepted Ottoman suzerainty, but he realised too that Isa’s claim to Zubara, even if were valid, could not be endorsed or enforced by Britain. Ross told Grant on 28 August 1873 that Isa ‘had not the power if he wished to protect tribes’ in Qatar and ordered the major not to intervene on the peninsula on his behalf as ‘his so called rights, were involved in uncertainty’. Grant also offered Sheikh Isa some fairly frank advice: ‘Remain strictly neutral and keep aloof from all complication on the mainland with the Turks, Wahabis, etc.’ But the advice fell on deaf ears. Isa would try to persuade the British of his rights to Zubara over the next six months. His persistence irritated the government in Delhi, which ordered Ross to demand that Sheikh Isa give up any hope of possessing Zubara. ‘It is desirable that the Chief should, as far as practicable, abstain from interfering in complication on the mainland’ of Qatar. Unlike Jassim, the government of India was keen not to give the Ottomans any excuse to station troops in Zubara, which would do little for maritime peace in the region.

  By 1874, Isa was of the opinion he would have to take matters into his own hands, and perhaps attack Zubara without British approval. His change of attitude followed news that Nasir bin Mubarak had taken up positions on the Qatar coast. It seemed clear Jassim was encouraging him to deal with the Naim tribesmen who might still support the Al Khalifa. And should Nasir be successful and re-establish the fort at Zubara, he might try to instigate a rebellion inside Bahrain itself. By the summer, Sheikh Isa’s concerns were more acute. Before he had an opportunity to sneak money and supplies to the Naim, Nasir and a force of Banu Hajir tribesmen had gathered at Zubara in a bid to infiltrate Bahrain. On this occasion, the British ships of the Bombay Marine had prevented an attack, but there was little to celebrate. On returning to Zubara, Nasir had taken out his frustration on any Naim tribesmen who came to hand. Though Nasir didn’t enjoy much fortune in the larger skirmishes, with no support from Bahrain and Jassim blocking supplies from the south, it was only a matter of time before Al Khalifa influence over the Naim would end.

  Sheikh Isa’s six-hour attack on the Banu Hajir of Qatar did little to stem Jassim’s push into the north-west. In fact it did the opposite. For once Ross got wind of events, he forbade Isa from carrying out anything similar ever again and was of a mind to punish him. On 10 December 1874, Ross told Isa in no uncertain terms that Bahrain had no possessions in Qatar whatsoever. He also made it clear to Isa that he should keep well away from the ‘feuds on the mainland’. From now on, Bahrain was just an island. Any hint of objection, Ross added, and the British would withdraw their ships and protection. Isa wrote a few letters in one last attempt to change some minds, but to no avail. By May 1875, Jassim had his victory. Isa had to accept he could not support the Naim. A Qatari nation was one step nearer. This was an extraordinary accomplishment. If you had spoken to Jassim’s father just ten years earlier, he probably wouldn’t have considered Zubara as part of Al Thani territory, even though his own father, Thani, had lived there for a time. But through careful manipulation of two empires, and the consequent clashes he had instigated, Jassim was well on the way to winning sovereignty over the whole of Qatar.

  Three years later, in 1878, Jassim and Nasir bin Mubarak led 2,000 men to the north, ostensibly to deal with reported acts of piracy. Jassim took the opportunity to sack and destroy Zubara. He had subdued the remaining Khalifa remnants of the Naim. What was more, the Royal Navy had prevented Bahrain from rescuing his supporters after the attack. He needn’t have bothered, for Jassim sent them to Bahrain himself, along with any Naim tribesmen who wished to leave. Zubara as a town ceased to exist. Its fort was destroyed. All that remained was its strategic importance. The only news that lessened Jassim’s joy over his many successes that year was of his father’s passing away. It also meant, however, that Jassim was no longer a prince regent; he was now the Sheikh of Qatar. The Ottoman government sent Zayyid Pasha, Mutasarrif of Najd, to Bida to congratulate him on his new position and assure him of Istanbul’s support for the future; he then asked for 10,000 krans in tax to be paid to the Porte!

  In many ways, 1878 had proved an annus mirabilis, but Jassim’s success in dealing with his external enemies was about to be challenged by internal division. In November 1879, the Al bu Kuwara tribe moved from Bida back to Fuwairit, denouncing Jassim’s pro-Ottoman policy. In 1880, the Banu Hajir of Hasa captured a boat belonging to Wakra and made a series of raids on Doha. In 1881, the Banu Hajir were joined by some of the remaining Naim. Perhaps the most embarrassing event, however, came later that year. The Ajman stole and drove 450 camels out of Qatar. Jassim appealed for Ottoman help in their recovery, but they made no effort to assist. It seemed that the Ottomans were only a fair-weather friend. After ten years of Jassim flying the Ottoman flag, the relationship was about to take a turn for the worse.

  8

  QATAR’S UNITY TESTED

  IN DECEMBER 2010, a US marine poking around a few dark caves in southern Helmand province, near the Pashtun town of Marja, came across something quite out of the ordinary. He could just make out its long, thin shape, half hidden among rocks, though it was carefully wrapped in a blanket. A few seconds later, he was looking at an ancient rifle – probably hidden from British patrols more than a century earlier. It was a Martini-Henry rifle, the best thing money could buy for the rank and file back in the 1870s and 1880s. Its robust, self-cocking, lever-operated, single-shot action embodied the weapon of empire. The rifle’s action had been designed in 1870 by the Swiss national Friedrich von Martini, while its seven-groove rifling was patented by a Scotsman, Alexande
r Henry. Around a million were made and used throughout the world’s colonies for over thirty years. They didn’t fire the familiar .303 round, but .450s. Some versions even fired .577s. Within a few years, the firearm was in action against Zulus, Boers and Russians.

  Not to be bettered by the British, the Ottomans had turned to an American manufacturing company in Providence and ordered thousands of Martini-Henry replicas for their troops in south-east Europe. The Turkish General Staff were most pleased with the result, but their men, outnumbered by Russian forces five to one, still lost Romania, Bulgaria and Montenegro by 1878. Nor were all Turkish soldiers issued with the rifle, certainly not the troops stationed in Qatar during the 1880s. And here was the ultimate irony. Jassim, who had never frowned on a healthy arms smuggling trade between Bahrain and Qatar, had managed to acquire and supply his tribesmen with the latest rifle on the market. Many of the Al Thani were better armed than the Ottoman troops sent to guard Doha!

  The weapons’ arrival could not have been more timely. By 1882, the Qayamaqam was facing various internal problems, even challenges to his authority from confederates. The Al bu Kuwara, for example, were deeply dissatisfied at pledging allegiance to any Ottoman and moved out of Doha, which was attacked several times by the Manasir and Awamir tribes. In 1884, the threat of imminent attack by the Ajman tribe was so great that no one dared go to the pearl fisheries that season. In a bid to deal with the dissent, Jassim first sought to tone down hostilities with his external enemies, particularly Bahrain. He even visited Sheikh Isa’s brother in eastern Qatar when he had brought his hawks and hounds on a hunting expedition.